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We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where
an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an
established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one’s
own product to that of a rival’s, empowers the latter to file for court intervention
if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative
advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes comparative advertising as a signal of product
quality. Comparative claims differ from generic ones as they open up
different strategic opportunities for rivals. Comparative advertising
contains both, wasteful advertising expenditure and an implicit or
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explicit quality claim (such as “my product is better than my rival’s
one”). This claim can be contested and is ex post verifiable by the court.
Hence, the rival firm has the possibility to make the court active by start-
ing a legal action against the advertiser. Comparative advertising thus
combines elements of directly and indirectly informative advertising.
Economic theory typically treats directly and indirectly informa-
tive advertising separately (for a comprehensive survey see Bagwell,
2007). When it is directly informative, advertising transmits information
to consumers either because such information is easily verifiable (as for
search attributes of products like price and location) or because false
claims are efficiently sanctioned. Obviously, in the latter case laws and
legal practice are essential for advertising claims to be truthful and, thus,
informative. By contrast, when advertising is informative in an indirect
way, it is informative irrespective of content. The last approach is based
on the idea that high advertising expenditures work as a device to signal
high product quality (e.g., Nelson, 1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). The signaling argument, intended to apply
to generic advertising, implies that the expenditure and not the content
of an ad is what really matters. This paper considers advertising which
potentially has information content but where the advertising strategy
may also involve wasteful expenditures.
In many countries, the law raises barriers against unfair use of (all
types of) advertising. However, a firm using comparative advertising is
at a particularly high risk of costly litigation. In particular, advertising
firms using a comparative claim risk to be prosecuted by competitors
that are explicitly or implicitly named.1 Take as an example the 1999
General Motors Corp. ad claiming that the Cadillac Seville STS outper-
forms BMW 540 in a slalom race. BMW had relevant information and
strong incentives to react to the claim, if false.
Costly litigation may be followed by significant damages. Dam-
ages include “lost” profits, corrective advertising expenses, and puni-
tive damages. In a number of cases in the U.S. punitive damages have
been significant. In 1986, U-Haul International claimed the comparative
advertising campaign by Jartran “do-it-yourself” moving company was
false and in violation of Lanham Act: the court agreed and awarded $40
million in damages, half of which were punitive.2
1. See also the discussion in subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
2. Notice that it is generally difficult to prove that consumers are really misled by an
ad. This problem was solved by the court ruling that when a marketer spends “substantial
funds” in an advertising campaign, the court will presume that consumers were misled
if the ad is determined to be false. In another case, in 2000 a federal judge ruled that
Papa John’s must pay over $468,000 in damages to Pizza Hut and desist from using
its tag line “Better ingredients. Better pizza.” The ruling was in favor of Pizza Hut,
as the ingredient comparison was found to be misleading. In fact, the claim cannot
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We consider a duopoly situation in which the incumbent sells a
product of known quality, while the entrant’s quality is yet unknown
to consumers. The entrant and the incumbent sequentially receive an
imprecise and private signal on the entrant’s quality. The entrant may
use dissipative advertising as a signal of quality. A low-quality entrant
would like to be perceived to be of high quality. By contrast, a high-
quality entrant does not want to be confused with a low-quality entrant.
The entrant can choose among generic or comparative advertising (or
choose not to advertise at all). If advertising is comparative, the entrant
claims that its quality is not lower than the incumbent’s. Although
the choice of comparative advertising empowers the rival with the
right to go to court, generic content-free advertising does not. Hence,
if the entrant uses comparative instead of generic or no advertising
it chooses to give the incumbent the option to go to court. Therefore,
consumers can infer that the entrant must think to have a strong case.
Although this general statement can easily be understood, our analysis
is warranted as far as it provides a detailed analysis of the signaling role
of comparative advertising, and it brings to the surface the impact of
the incumbent’s information about the entrant’s quality on equilibrium
outcomes. To support comparative advertising as a signal, two features
from the literature of directly and indirectly informative advertising
are combined: content claims and money burning. Interestingly, for
some parameters of the model the use of comparative advertising may
not involve any money burning; in this case modeling comparative
advertising as directly informative advertising can be seen as an
appropriate short cut. In this respect, our analysis reveals which legal
environment and information structure leads to such an outcome.
In our model, high quality and low quality lead to the same
variable costs. This allows us to exclude pure price signaling and price-
advertising signals with generic advertising as equilibrium outcomes.
As we show, comparative advertising can work as a signal of product
quality because, due to the court’s action, high- and low-quality entrants
have different incentives to use this type of advertising. In addition, due
to the payment of damages, the incumbent has an incentive to go to court
if he believes that his legal action is sufficiently likely to succeed. We
distinguish between two types of equilibria: unconditionally contested
and conditionally contested comparative advertising equilibria. In the
first type of equilibrium, it is optimal for the incumbent not to condition
his strategy on his private information about the entrant’s quality, such
that he brings every comparative advertising claim to court. In the
be scientifically substantiated nor taste tests exist that prove a statistically significant
preference for Papa John’s product. For details, see Barigozzi and Peitz (2006).
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second type of equilibrium, the incumbent only goes to court if its
private information suggests that the entrant is of low quality. The type
of equilibrium which prevails, among others things, depends on the
informativeness of the signals entrant and incumbent receive and on
the monetary transfers imposed by the court.
Our model shows that with efficient courts that are able to obtain
rather precise information about the entrant’s product quality and are
willing to impose damages, comparative advertising should be a widely
used marketing instrument.3 Relevant sectors are food, retail, and
motoring, in which entrant often rely heavily on aggressive marketing
strategies.
Comparative advertising has become increasingly popular in
recent years.4 Perhaps the single most important reason for the more
widespread use of comparative advertising is a change in public
policy. In particular, in 1979 in the United States the Federal Trade
Commission encouraged the use of comparative advertising because
direct comparison ads would enable consumers to make more informed
purchasing decisions—moreover, comparison ads would ease the con-
sumer’s task of evaluating the performance of particular brands against
other brands (see the FTC statement, available at http: \\ www.ftc.gov).5
Our paper provides a formal analysis of this alleged information role of
comparative advertising.
Our analysis refers to comparative advertising claims that use the
established quality of an incumbent as an anchor. Formally, our model
does not distinguish between comparative and noncomparative quality
advertising claims. Thus, as long as the incumbent is as likely to succeed
3. In spite of some researchers in marketing being cautious about the general effective-
ness of comparative advertising (see, e.g., Shimp, 1990; Pechmann and Ratneshwa, 1991;
Jain et al., 1998; Barone and Miniard, 1999), the marketing literature agrees that if a brand
has a small market share, or is unfamiliar to buyers, it can enhance the relevance of an ad
by naming a leading brand, which is regularly purchased or is familiar to consumers (e.g.,
Shimp and Dyer, 1978; Muehling et al., 1990; Pechmann and Stewart, 1990; Gnepa, 1993).
This belief is shared by practitioners. For example, according to Mitsubishi’s marketing
manager the company used comparative advertising when entering the European market,
“to guide the consumer by making associations with top brand names” (Alison Coleman
in Director; London, June 2000).
4. Until the 1970s the use of comparative advertising appears to have been negligible.
For the United States in the 1980s, Muehling et al. (1990) report that around 40% of
all advertising was comparative. Pechmann and Stewart (1990) on different data find a
percentage as high as 80%. Although the precise definition of comparative advertising is
debatable these numbers demonstrate the frequent use of implicit or explicit comparison
claims in advertising.
5. In the European Union, the use of comparative advertising was not encouraged
(and, in some countries, explicitly banned) and still appears to be less common than in
the United States. Practice among member states was markedly different and laws on
comparative advertising were harmonized only in April 2000. For a general discussion of
comparative advertising from an antitrust perspective, see Barigozzi and Peitz (2006).
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in challenging content claims that are noncomparative in nature, our
results apply to content advertising more generally. Then in our model
“comparative advertising” can be replaced by “content advertising”
more generally. Our argument also extends to content claims that can
be contested by third parties such as public authorities and consumer
associations (see the discussion section).
The literature on comparative advertising is scarce. Shy (1992,
1995, chap. 11) assumes that comparative advertising is directly in-
formative and focuses on the matching of heterogeneous consumers
with differentiated brands. Anderson and Renault (2006b) consider
comparative advertising with respect to horizontal characteristics in
a market with known quality differences and analyze information
disclosure by rival firms. By contrast, Aluf and Shy (2001) postulate
that (negative) comparative advertising is persuasive and decreases the
willingness to pay for the competitor’s product. Our paper differs from
these works by taking the view that claims in comparative ads are
potentially misleading.
In the literature on indirectly informative advertising, we add to
the seminal work by Nelson (1974), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), and
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), as explained above.6 In this literature, the
paper that is closest to ours is Matthews and Fertig (1990).7
To summarize, our paper lies at the intersection of two strands
of literature on advertising. One strand considers directly informative
advertising (see, e.g., Anderson and Renault, 2006a, and Meurer and
Stahl, 1994). As it was mentioned before, in this literature content
claims are always truthful so that the question of the credibility of these
claims does not arise. Another strand considers indirectly informative
advertising, that is, money burning is perceived by consumers as a
signal of product quality. In this literature, no content claims are made.
In our setup, comparative advertising contains content claims that are
6. There is somewhat related work that considers actions by the entrant different
from advertising that make her profits sensitive to detected quality. These actions include
money-back guarantees and warranties (see, e.g., Moorthy and Srinivasan, 1995, and
Shieh, 1996). In our paper, the success of the entrant’s signaling efforts relies on the
possible reaction by her rival, in contrast to this work.
Moreover, the present paper can be seen as complementary to the literature on generic
advertising and market entry (Bagwell and Ramey, 1988; Bagwell and Ramey, 1990;
Linnemer, 1998). In these papers, the advertising strategy is undertaken by the incumbent
to deter entry, whereas in our model it is taken by an entrant to improve its position in
the market.
7. In their model, an incumbent and an entrant can use dissipative generic advertising
to signal the entrant’s quality. Similar to our model, their model allows for a reaction by
the incumbent to the entrant’s advertising decision. However, their model is markedly
different from ours: in particular, the incumbent’s reaction is in the form of a counterad-
vertising campaign and, more importantly, the incumbent’s strategy space is not affected
by the entrant’s advertising decision.
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not necessarily truthful and are supported through publicly observable
money burning.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model and find that neither pure price signals nor price-advertising
signals with generic advertising are viable in our setup. In Section 3,
we characterize the two types of comparative advertising equilibria,
unconditionally contested and conditionally contested comparative
advertising equilibria. In Section 4, we discuss modifications and
extensions of the model.
2. A Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Information
We consider a market where an established firm, the incumbent I, sells
a product of known high quality qI = q H and a new firm, entrant E,
has entered with a product of quality qE , which may be either high
or low, qE ∈ {q L , q H}. In our simple model with two quality levels
our argument equally holds if the incumbent is of known low quality.
Both firms have some market power, for example, because they offer
horizontally differentiated products. Then we may think of products
with two characteristics, a horizontal one along which firms necessarily
differ and a vertical one which affects all consumers in the same way
(for a concrete specification see Barigozzi et al., 2006). The two firms and
a population of consumers play a multistage game with a sequence of
moves that shall be explained in the following, after some preliminary
description of the environment.
Direct information about product quality: The entrant’s quality is jointly
determined by some random event, which determines her potential
quality qˆE ∈ {qˆ L , qˆ H}, and by her effort e ∈ {0, 1}. High quality q H results
from the combination of a high-quality technology (i.e., high potential
quality) and high effort by the entrant, e = 1. Whenever the entrant uses
a low-quality technology or exerts low effort, her quality is low, qE = q L .
This means that the entrant of high potential quality only distinguishes
herself from a firm with low potential quality if she chooses effort e = 1.8
Nature draws from a pool of high- and low-quality technologies. The
former is chosen with probability α0, the latter with probability 1 − α0.
Before deciding whether to exert effort, the entrant receives some noisy
private information about her technology. If the entrant has a high-
quality technology, the entrant receives the signal sE = s H . If she has a
low-quality technology, the entrant observes the (wrong) signal sE = s H
with probability λE ; and the correct signal sE = sL with probability
8. If we assumed that qˆ L = 0 and qˆ H be a strictly positive number, then we could have
actual quality to be equal to the product qE = eqˆE .
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(1 − λE ). We thus have Prob{sE = s H | qˆ H} = 1, Prob{sE = sL | qˆ H} = 0,
Prob{sE = s H | qˆ L} = λE , Prob{sE = sL | qˆ L} = 1 − λE . Hence, if the en-
trant observes s H she cannot be sure whether the product is of high
potential quality qˆ H whereas, if she observes sL , she knows that her
product is of low quality qˆ L = q L .9 After observing the signal s H the
entrant infers that she has a high-quality technology with probability
α1 ≡ Prob
{
qE = qˆ H | sE = s H
} = α0
α0 + (1 − α0)λE . (1)
Consumers and the incumbent do not observe the entrant’s signal,
nor its effort. Note that irrespective of the signal received, when no
other player could upset consumers’ beliefs, an entrant would gain if
consumers hold the belief that she had received signal s H and exerted
effort e = 1.
We assume that, after price competition has taken place between
the two firms, the incumbent uses his own noisy detection technology
in order to collect some information about the entrant’s true quality
(given that the entrant already chose whether to exert effort or not).
We assume in particular that: if qE = q H , the incumbent observes signal
sI = s H with probability 1; if qE = q L the incumbent observes signal
s H with probability λI and signal sL with probability 1 − λI , that is,
Prob{sI = s H | q L} = λI and Prob{sI = sL | q L} = 1 − λI . Hence, if the
incumbent observes sL he knows that the entrant is of low quality and
that going to court will be successful. We assume that incumbent’s
and entrant’s signal are independent so that the probability that both
observe the wrong signal is: Prob{sI = s H ∧ sE = s H | q L} = λI λE .
Hence, entrant and incumbent receive signals s j ∈ {sL , s H}, for j =
E , I . Probability 1 − λ j represents the accuracy of the signal received
by firm j. It depends on the particular market whether the incumbent or
the entrant obtain more precise information. Thus, although we could
allow for both cases we shall focus on the case 1 − λE ≥ 1 − λI . In fact,
in the innovation phase, the entrant is likely to obtain more precise
information about the merits of her technology because it can use
information acquired during development. For this reason, the entrant
is likely to be better informed than the incumbent about her potential to
produce high quality. However, we reckon that because the incumbent
has time to test the product before he decides whether to react to a
comparative claim, the case 1 − λE ≥ 1 − λI can also be relevant.
As for the incumbent, he will revise his beliefs about the entrant’s
quality after observing the entrant’s advertising strategy and again after
9. It is straightforward to allow for Prob{sE = sL | qˆ H} > 0. In the separating equilib-
rium with comparative advertising the entrant then wrongly decides not to exert effort if
sE = sL but potential quality is high. Our main results are robust to this modification.
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receiving the signal sI . Consumers neither observe signals sE and sI nor
effort e.
Advertising: We follow the literature started by Nelson (1974) and
assume that advertising has no direct impact on utility or demand. Its
only possible influence is, indirectly, through consumers’ perception of
quality. The type of advertising and its cost are publicly observable.
We assume that advertising is not needed to inform consumers of
the marketed products’ existence; therefore, if consumers were fully
informed about the entrant’s quality, the entrant would not advertise
at all. Advertising, in our context, can be generic, namely, without any
verifiable claim, or comparative, namely, with a verifiable comparison of
the type “my product is as good as the incumbent’s one.” Furthermore,
in the discussion section, we argue that our model also applies to
content advertising which makes no comparison to rivals’ products
but, contrary to generic claims, contains content claims that can be
challenged in court.
The entrant has three options as to the advertising strategy:
(i) no advertising A = 0; (ii) generic advertising with expenditure
Ag ≥ A0 > 0; (iii) comparative advertising with expenditure Ac ≥ A0. To
distinguish no advertising from advertising with minimal expenditure,
we assume that there is a lower bound for advertising expenditure,
A0 > 0, which is necessary to post an ad. Hence A = 0 stands for the
choice not to advertise, A = A0 stands for advertising with no signaling
cost. The distinction between (ii) and (iii) matters because generic
advertising contains no explicit or implicit comparison claim and no
legal actions can be taken against it. On the contrary, comparative
advertising contains such a claim (possibly in combination with some
money burning). This claim can be falsified and is ex post verifiable by
the court.
We will see that no separating equilibria exist where the firm can
use generic advertising as part of its signalling strategy. This means that,
in our model, generic advertising cannot be indirectly informative. By
contrast, if the entrant uses comparative advertising the incumbent has
the option to go to court. Legal costs and damages, therefore, attach
an additional cost to a false or misleading claim by the entrant and
she can signal quality using comparative ads (with or without burned
money).
Lawsuit threats: The incumbent’s action space depends upon the en-
trant’s strategy choice: in the case of comparative advertising, the
incumbent’s action space is the set {, a}, where  denotes the decision
to dispute the entrant’s quality claim and file for a lawsuit, while no
action (implicitly accept the quality claim) is denoted as a. If the entrant
Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality 1079
does not advertise, or if she uses generic ads, and the incumbent cannot
file, its action space is trivially {a}.
We assume that action a has no cost attached, while the choice of
, which triggers automatically court intervention, implies legal costs cI
for the incumbent and cE for the entrant. Total legal costs are c = cI +
cE . The court has the ability to check the entrant’s product quality: to
avoid further complications we assume that the true quality is perfectly
revealed to the court. However, we assume that the court does not have
any additional evidence, for example, about the realization of the signal
received by the entrant, sE . If the court asked evidence to the entrant
about the value of sE the entrant would be subject to a moral hazard
trap and not be credible.10 Therefore, the court cannot judge whether
the entrant has acted in good faith or not. If the court finds the entrant’s
quality to be low, the incumbent obtains a payment from the entrant,
d L ≥ 0. If, however, the court finds the entrant’s quality to be high, the
incumbent shall (partially) cover the entrant’s legal cost. In this case, the
incumbent pays d H with 0 ≤ d H ≤ cE . No payments are made by the
entrant if the court finds the entrant’s product to be of high quality.11 If
each party has to bear its own legal costs and no damages are awarded
we have d L = d H = 0.
The multi-stage game: To simplify the description of the game, suppose
at this point that only comparative advertising or no advertising is
possible. The game then develops as follows:
Stage 1. Nature randomly chooses the potential quality, qˆ H or qˆ L . High
quality is drawn with probability α0, low quality with probability
1 − α0. Nature also chooses a signal for the entrant, sE ∈ {sL , s H},
about the result of this draw.
Stage 2a. The entrant observes sE ∈ {sL , s H} and then chooses effort
e ∈ {0, 1} with associated cost ef , where f > 0. Signal and effort choice
are not observed neither by the incumbent nor by consumers.
Stage 2b. The entrant chooses not to advertise A = 0 or spends A ≥ A0
on comparative advertising.
Stage 3a. The incumbent observes A.
10. If e and sE were verifiable, the court could acquit the entrant if e = 1 and sE = s H
or at least decide not to impose punitive damages. Our general insight about the role
of comparative advertising is robust to this modification. The main difference is that the
precision of the entrant’s signal would become less important.
11. Suppose the court does not want to impose damages in the form of lost profits
or punitive damages. Then the special case where d L = cI and d H = cE is equivalent to
the situation in which the loosing party has to pay all the legal costs which corresponds
to the rule in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in the United States, each party bears its
own costs.
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Stage 3b. Both firms simultaneously set prices pI and pE .
Stage 4. Consumers observe advertising and prices (but nothing else),
update their beliefs about the entrants quality, and make their
purchasing decision.
Stage 5. The incumbent receives signal sI ∈ {s H , sL} about the entrant’s
quality and revises beliefs accordingly. If comparative advertising
has been chosen at stage 2b, the incumbent decides whether to sue
the entrant: zI ∈ {, a}, where zI is the incumbent’s action.
Stage 6. If A ≥ A0 and zI = , the court becomes active and discovers
the entrant’s type. Final legal payments are made and firms receive
profits.
Equilibrium: We use the solution concept of weak Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. An equilibrium of the game is defined as a strategy profile
and a belief system, such that each player’s strategy is sequentially
rational, and the incumbent’s and consumers’ beliefs are updated
according to Bayes’ rule whenever this is possible. An equilibrium is
said to be fully separating when consumers’ beliefs assign probability 1
to the true state (which depends the signal received by the entrant and
the effort choice) and 0 to the other. In particular, we are interested in
separating equilibria where the entrant uses no advertising and exerts
no effort if she receives signal sE = sL , while she chooses a comparative
claim and some expenditure level A, and she exerts effort e = 1 if she
receives signal s H .
Profit functions: We assume that variable costs are independent of
quality. Without loss of generality, we set them equal to zero. In addition,
apart from the need to provide effort at cost f , there are no additional
fixed costs involved for producing high quality. We denote by β the
probability assigned by consumers to the event that the entrant’s quality
is high, namely, to the joint event that qˆE = qˆ H and that e = 1. We denote
E (pI , pE , β) the profits, gross of possible costs to provide effort and
to advertise, of an entrant who is perceived by consumers to be of high
quality with probability β, given prices pI and pE . The incumbents
profits, gross of possible legal costs, depend on prices and on probability
β and is denoted by I (pI , pE , β).
The entrant’s profits are increasing, while the incumbent ones
are decreasing in the probability β. Thus, the following inequalities
hold:
• P.1 E (pI , pE , β) > E (pI , pE , β ′) if β > β ′
• P.2 I (pI , pE , β) < I (pI , pE , β ′) if β > β ′.
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Properties (P.1) and (P.2) are standard properties of many oligopoly
models where products have some degree of both, horizontal and
vertical differentiation.12
3. Comparative Advertising as a Signal
The entrant can choose e = 1 or e = 0. Obviously, because the first choice
is costly, it makes no sense when sE = sL . Therefore, the entrant in our
model is interested in signaling that she has chosen e = 1 and sE = s H
. This is the sense in which we use the term “quality signaling” here: it
implies separating at the same time from an entrant who receives signal
sL and from an entrant who chooses e = 0. Because sE = s H does not
guarantee that the potential quality be qˆ = qˆ H , true quality will indeed
remain a random variable on which consumers form expectations even
at a separating equilibrium (the equilibrium level of β will be always
less than 1, as it shall be shown below).
Before addressing the signaling property of comparative advertis-
ing we make some observations. First, consumer beliefs are independent
of pI because the incumbent does not possess any private information
at the price setting stage. Second, to consider generic advertising in
our setup, we simply eliminate the possibility for the incumbent to take
legal actions in the multi-stage game. Third, in our model the entrant can
signal her quality neither with price alone nor with price and generic
advertising. This is essentially due to the fact that variable costs are
independent of quality and that, at the pricing stage, the incumbent
does not have any information about the entrant’s quality.
Even though the entrant can signal her quality choice neither with
price alone nor with price and generic advertising, she is able to signal
quality using comparative advertising. In other words, where price and
generic advertising fail as a signal of quality, comparative advertising
is able to transmit information to consumers (and to the incumbent):
comparative advertising has a higher signaling power than price and
generic advertising together. The rest of this section makes this claim
precise.
We use the term advertising for comparative advertising because
this can be the only viable form of advertising. Note that at a separating
equilibrium the incumbent infers the signal that was received by the
entrant sE and the entrant’s associated effort choice from the entrant’s
advertising decision. He plays his best response to the price set by
the entrant. If sE = sL both firms set mutual best responses p∗I (sL ) and
p∗E (s
L ), respectively, and the corresponding net profits are denoted by
12. Several examples are presented and discussed in Garella and Peitz (2000).
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π∗I (0) = ∗I (0) and π∗E (0) = ∗E (0), where prices are replaced by their
equilibrium values given β = 0. If sE = s H , the entrant may not be able
to set its “full information” price (that is the price that would prevail
if all parties had learnt sE = s H) because consumers may have beliefs
that assign a low probability to qE = q H at this price. The entrant may
therefore want to distort its price and use price together with advertising
as a signal of quality. A deviation from the full information prices
then would obviously lead to profits that are different from the full
information ones. To avoid the entrant with sE = sL or e = 0 to mimic
the behavior of the entrant with sE = s H and e = 1 the advertising
expenditure (and, possibly, the deviation from the full information
price) has to be chosen sufficiently large to assure that the entrant’s
separating constraint is satisfied.
Definition 1: We distinguish two types of separating equilibria. In both
these equilibria the entrant chooses e = 0 and no advertising, A = 0, if she
observes sE = sL :
1. Unconditionally contested comparative advertising equilibria (UCA). The
entrant chooses e = 1 and comparative advertising with A ≥ A0, if she
observes sE = s H ; independent of the realization of sI the incumbent files
for a lawsuit whenever the entrant has advertised.
2. Conditionally contested comparative advertising equilibria (CCA). The
entrant chooses e = 1 and comparative advertising with A ≥ A0, if she
observes sE = s H ; the incumbent files against advertising only if he observes
sI = sL .
In both types of comparative advertising equilibria the incumbent
claims damages if comparative advertising was used in state sI = sL .
What distinguishes these two types of equilibria is the incumbent’
reaction if he observes sI = s H . At a CCA, along the equilibrium
path, the incumbent reacts to advertising only if the signal he receives
diverges from the one that the entrant has observed. At a UCA, the
incumbent always contests comparative advertising claims. Clearly, if
the incumbent’s signal sI is uninformative a CCA cannot exist. We
analyze the role of the incumbent’s information in more detail in Section
3.3.
At a separating equilibrium, if the entrant undertakes an adver-
tising campaign, consumers infer that the entrant received the signal
sE = s H and that she exerted effort e = 1. They update their beliefs
accordingly, that is, they believe that the product is of high quality with
probability α1 as given by (1).13
13. Note that we restrict attention to pure strategies. If we allow for mixing additional
equilibria may exist. In such a case, the signaling power of comparative advertising would
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For the incumbent, the decision whether to file against the entrant
is taken after the signal sI has been observed. Let us consider the
incumbent’s incentive to react to a comparative ad when he observes
the signal sI = sL , that is when he learns that the rival’s quality is low.
Suppose that d L > cI . By reacting to a misleading ad, the incumbent
obtains πI (pI , pE , α1) = I (pI , pE , α1) − cI + d L , whereas he obtains
only I (pI , pE , α1) if he does not react. Hence the action a is strictly
dominated by . We can state the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose that d L > cI . Then in any separating equilibrium of
the game, the incumbent’s strategy in response to the use of comparative
advertising is to file a lawsuit  if he observes sI = sL .
Note that the signaling mechanism can work as long as the
incumbent can at least recover his legal costs.
Let us consider now the incumbent’s incentive to react to a
comparative ad when he observes the signal sI = s H . When sI = s H the
incumbent assigns revised probability α2 to the event that the entrant
be of high quality and that going to court will not be successful,
α2 = Pr
{
qE = q H | sE = s H ∧ sI = s H
} = α0
α0 + (1 − α0)λI λE . (2)
Accordingly, the incumbent’s expected profits from filing are equal
to I (pI , pE , α1) + (1 − α2)d L − α2d H − cI . Although profits from not
filing are simply I (pI , pE , α1) . Hence the incumbent files in state s H
if and only if
α2 ≤ αˆ ≡
(
d L − cI
)
/(d L + d H), (3)
that is, the incumbent always chooses  when the probability α2 that the
entrant is a high-quality producer is low enough. This is more likely to
be satisfied if the precision of the signals 1 − λI , and 1 − λE are low.
If α2 > αˆ, the incumbent does not file when sI = s H and thus a UCA
cannot be supported as an equilibrium.
Because we are interested in signaling power of comparative
advertising, we will focus on separating equilibria in which the entrant
does not distort her price for signaling purposes. This will allow us
to characterize separating equilibria with comparative advertising in
the absence of price distortions. Because variable costs are zero, we
know that one of the separating equilibria, provided they exist, has the
property that incumbent and entrant set prices according to their full
information best responses, that is, the entrant with sE = s H does not
be lower because consumers’ up-dated beliefs that the entrant’s quality is high will be
lower than α1.
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need to distort its price to convince consumers that she received signal
sE = s H . This equilibrium is robust to forward induction arguments
captured by the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) or stability
by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) because price distortions are equally
attractive for entrants with sE = sL and sE = s H .14 In particular, we can
hold the beliefs constant in the entrant’s price. The entrant’s gross profits
that follow from the solution of the first-order conditions, in the system
of the Nash best replies equations, with nondistorted prices, is denoted
by ∗E (α1) for sE = s H . Again, net profits are denoted by π∗E (α1).
3.1 The Case α2 ≤ αˆ: Unconditionally Contested
Comparative Advertising Equilibria (UCA)
Recall that at a UCA equilibrium the incumbent always reacts to
a comparative ad, on and off the equilibrium path. The entrant’s
separating constraint when she observes sE = sL is
π∗E (0) ≥ ∗E (α1) − A− d L − cE (4)
while (including the cost of effort) the separating constraint ensuring
that an entrant has observed sE = s H and has played e = 1 is
∗E (α1) − A− (1 − α1)d L + α1d H − cE − f ≥ π∗E (0). (5)
Note the difference with respect to the case in which the court
cannot be active. Here, the fact that the court gathers information
about true quality and enforces side payments between the parties
(depending on this information), can make comparative advertising a
credible signal. The court becomes active because the incumbent expects
to benefit in spite of paying legal costs.
Proposition 1: Suppose inequality (3) is satisfied. An unconditionally
contested comparative advertising equilibrium entails a level of expenditure
A such that
∗E (α1) − π∗E (0) − d L − cE ≤ A ≤ ∗E (α1)
−π∗E (0) − (1 − α1)d L + α1d H − cE − f. (6)
UCA equilibria exist if α1(d L + d H) ≥ f .
14. In our model, a price distortion is akin to money burning for the entrant and
there is a continuum of separating equilibria that are payoff-equivalent for the entrant.
This is different from other models with price and advertising signals of quality such as
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), in which there is a role for price distortions (possibly together
with advertising expenditure) to signal product quality. In that model, using equilibrium
selection arguments such as the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) or strategic
stability by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) the firm will not set its full information price if
it is of high quality.
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As a special case, if the damages d L are large enough, the entrant
pays just the minimal amount A0 and does not need to burn any
additional money to credibly transmit information to consumers. In
other words, a claim that the state is s H and effort is e = 1 can be
supported without a proper signaling cost if the lower bound in (6)
is less than A0. In this case, the entrant does not incur any dissipative
advertising costs to make the signal credible. It is as if the entrant was
telling consumers: Because my rival can inflict a loss upon me if I lie, you
must to a large extent believe my words that my product is of comparable
quality. Interestingly, in such a situation one can see a model with directly
informative comparative advertising as a short cut of our model because
the advertising firm does not incur any signaling cost. Note also that,
in a situation in which comparative advertising transmits information
without a cost so that A0 = 0, the entrant prefers not to use price as a
signal of product quality because a price distortion is costly whereas
advertising is not.
In the case where A > A0 the entrant uses dissipative advertising
expenditure together with the comparative claim to signal quality to
consumers. The higher the damages and legal costs the entrant has
to pay, the more effective is comparative advertising in transmitting
information in the sense that less money is burnt (as it is apparent by
inspection of the lower bound in (6) above).
The entrant’s expected profit using the minimum levels of adver-
tising in the case of unconditionally contested comparative ads are com-
puted as follows. Before receiving any signal, the entrant expects with
probability α0 to be of type q H , in this case to observe sE = s H , to pay
f + A, and to be contested. Profits then are E (α1) − f − A+ d H − cE .
Similarly, with probability (1 − α0) she expects to be of quality q L . In
this case, with probability (1 − λE ) she observes signal sE = sL , does
not advertise and obtains profits π∗E (0). However, with probability
λE she observes signal sE = s H , pays f + A, is contested, and will
pay damages d L + cE . Profits then are E (α1) − f − A− d L − cE . The
entrant’s expected equilibrium profit before receiving the signal is
E(E ) = α0
(
∗E (α1) − f − A+ d H − cE
)
+ (1 − α0)
[
(1 − λE )π∗E (0) + λE
(
∗E (α1) − f − A− d L − cE
)]
.
By substituting A with its minimum level, namely, Amin = ∗E (α1) −
π∗E (0) − d L − cE , this reduces to
E(E ) = π∗E (0) − (α0 + (1 − α0)λE ) f + α0(d H + d L ), (7)
provided that Amin ≥ A0.
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3.2 The Case α2 ≥ αˆ: Conditionally Contested
Comparative Advertising Equilibria (CCA)
Recall that a CCA has the property that the entrant only uses compara-
tive advertising if her signal is sE = s H (as in a UCA) and the incumbent
only goes to court as a response to comparative advertising if his signal
is sI = sL . Because in our model the court does not make mistake and a
signal sI = sL is fully revealing, a CCA has the property that along the
equilibrium path the entrant is always found guilty.
The entrant’s revised probability that the incumbent gets signal
sI = s H depends upon the signal sE that she has observed herself. If the
entrant has received signal sE = s H she knows that the incumbent can
only receive signal sI = sL if the quality is qE = q L . Hence, Prob(sI =
sL | sE = s H) = Prob(sI = sL | qE = q L ) Prob(qE = q L | sE = s H) = (1 −
λI )(1 − α1). This implies that Prob(sI = s H | sE = s H) = α1 + (1 − α1)λI .
If the entrant has observed sE = sL she knows that the quality is low
(with probability 1). Thus Prob(sI = s H | sE = sL ) = λI and Prob(sI =
sL | sE = sL ) = 1 − λI .
Suppose the entrant has observed sE = sL . If this entrant mimics
the entrant who received signal s H , she knows that with probability
Prob(sI = sL | sE = sL ) = 1 − λI the incumbent will go to court, in which
case she will always loose. The expected profit of a cheating entrant is
therefore ∗E (α1) − A− (1 − λI )(d L + cE ) and the separating constraint
for an entrant receiving signal sL is
π∗E (0) ≥ ∗E (α1) − A− (1 − λI )(d L + cE ). (8)
Because (1 − λI )(1 − α1) is the probability that the incumbent
observes signal sI = sL given signal sE = s H , the separating condition
for an entrant who has received signal s H is
∗E (α1) − A− f − (1 − α1)(1 − λI )(d L + cE ) ≥ π∗E (0). (9)
Rewriting these two inequalities we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2: Suppose inequality (3) is not satisfied. A conditionally con-
tested comparative advertising (CCA) equilibrium entails a level of expenditure
A such that
∗E (α1) − π∗E (0) − (1 − λI )
(
d L + cE
) ≤ A ≤ ∗E (α1) − π∗E (0)
− f − (1 − α1)(1 − λI )
(
d L + cE
) (10)
CCA equilibria exist if α1(1 − λI )(d L + cE ) ≥ f.
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As it is apparent from inspection of (10) at a conditionally contested
separating equilibrium, the minimum amount of advertising necessary
to signal quality is decreasing in the precision of the signal observed
by the incumbent. Recalling the expression for α1 and α2 as given,
respectively, in (1) and (2), we observe that conditionally contested
comparative equilibria tend to be compatible with high precision both
of the entrant’s and the incumbent’s signal.
The expected profit to an entrant using the minimum levels of
advertising in the case of conditionally contested comparative ads are
computed as follows. Before receiving any signal, the entrant expects
with probabilityα0 to be of type q H , to observe sE = s H , and to pay f + A
without being contested, getting profits ∗E (α1) − f − A. Similarly, with
probability (1 − α0) she expects to be of quality q L . In this case, with
probability (1 − λE ) she observes signal sE = sL , does not advertise, and
gets profitsπ∗E (0). However, with probabilityλE she observes signal sE =
s H , pays f + A, and is contested with probability (1 − λI ), in which case
she will pay damages d L + cE and get profits ∗E (α1) − f − A− d L − cE .
Then, the expected profit to an entrant before receiving the signal is
E(E ) = α0
(
∗E (α1) − f − A
) + (1 − α0)(1 − λE )π∗E (0)
+ (1 − α0)λE
[
(1 − λI )
(
∗E (α1) − f − A− d L − cE
)
+ λI
(
∗E (α1) − f − A
))]
for α2 ≥ αˆ. By substituting A with its minimum level, namely, Amin =
∗E (α1) − π∗E (0) − (1 − λI )(d L + cE ), this reduces to
E(E ) = π∗E (0) − (α0 + (1 − α0)λE ) f + α0(1 − λI )
(
d L + cE
)
, (11)
which is increasing in (1 − λI ). Hence it follows:
Corollary 1: (a) In the case of conditionally contested comparative ad-
vertising equilibria, the minimum amount of advertising necessary to signal
quality is decreasing and the expected profit of an entrant is increasing in the
precision of the signal received by the incumbent. (b) The minimum amount of
advertising necessary to signal quality is decreasing and the expected profit of
an entrant is increasing in the level of damages d L .
One may speculate that the entrant would design her product so
as to make quality claims easily testable by the incumbent, namely, in
such a way as to increase the value of 1 − λI .
3.3 The Role of the Incumbent’s Information
In this subsection, we investigate the role of the incumbent’s information
in more detail. Once the incumbent has been given the ability to react to
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comparative advertising, does it matter for him to receive some private
information about the entrant’s quality?
As a start, consider the case where the entrant receives a signal
but the incumbent receives no signal, which is equivalent to the case
where λE < 1, while λI = 1. When λI = 1 one also has α2 = α1. This
implies that if he received no signal, the incumbent contests comparative
advertising claims if and only if α1 ≤ αˆ, where αˆ is defined as in (3). If
α1 > αˆ, therefore, the incumbent would never react to ads and there
would exist no equilibria with comparative advertising as a signal.
In equilibrium e = 0 and the entrant’s equilibrium profit is always
π∗E (0). Let us compare the case λI = 1 with the case where 0 < λI < 1.
Here, the information of the incumbent is valuable for the entrant
because it may make comparative advertising viable as a signal in
which case the entrant chooses e = 1 when sE = s H . In particular,
for some parameter constellations there exist conditionally contested
comparative advertising equilibria. Hence, the incumbent reacts if he
observes sI = sL . The expected profit to the entrant before the game
starts is given by (11), which is larger than π∗E (0).
If α1 < αˆ and λI locally decreases from 1, then one still has α2 < αˆ.
In this case, the behavior of the incumbent leads to unconditionally
contested comparative advertising equilibria irrespective of wether
λI = 1 or λI < 1, so that in this case there is no difference between
giving information to the incumbent or not. If λI is reduced by so much
as to have α2 > αˆ, giving information to the incumbent makes him
change behavior and be more prudent by reacting only if he observes
sI = sL ; this leads to a CCE instead of a UCE. The entrant’s expected
profit before the game starts is then as in (11) instead of the expected
profit under a UCE given in (7). This difference is always negative.
Hence, there is a case where the information given to the incum-
bent (here measured by the amount 1 − λI ) is crucial for obtaining
separation, namely, the case where α1 > αˆ. In that case, the expected
profits of the entrant are also raised. If by contrast α1 < αˆ the separating
equilibrium either does not change or changes from UCE to CCE and
expected profits to the entrant either do not change or decrease.
4. Discussion
4.1 Comparative versus Noncomparative
Content Advertising
We have decided to refer to comparative advertising for two reasons.
First, consumers often lack a clear understanding of absolute content
statements and it is much easier for the consumer to grasp simple
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messages such as “my product is as good as,” rather than interpret
a more complex statement about the quality of a product. A good
example is nutrition information. Here, advertisers rather state that their
products contain a certain percentage more or less than the reference
product. Put differently, many product features in isolation (i.e., in the
absence to a comparison to a reference product) are not understood by
consumers and therefore are an ineffective means of communication. If
this is the case, content claims are comparative in nature.
Second, there are instances in which the use of comparative adver-
tising makes the advertiser more vulnerable to lawsuit threats. This in
turn makes comparative a more viable signal. This can be exemplified
by what the U.S. law defines as “puffery.” An ad can be considered
puffery as long as “the customer believes the commercial statement is
so vague, ridiculous or opinionated that it could not possibly be taken
serious” (for a clear explanation see Jim Edwards in Brandweek, New
York, May 2001). Puffery is accepted in noncomparative advertising
but it becomes illegal whenever it tags a competitor, exactly as in the
case of Papa John’s ad “Better ingredients better pizza.” For details, see
Barigozzi and Peitz (2006).
4.2 Fraudulent Advertising and Public Agencies
As mentioned in the introduction, our model can be interpreted as a
model about advertising with content claims that can be challenged
by third parties. If the content claim turns out to be false the en-
trant is sanctioned by the court. The reaction of the incumbent to
comparison ads is one mechanism to have such a pecuniary penalty
be imposed. Other different mechanisms for content advertising may
involve the intervention of public agencies, like the FTC and the DOJ
in the United States and national competition authorities in Europe.
Consumer associations also may act on behalf of consumers. In all
these cases, a content claim makes a firm vulnerable to lawsuits. This
has been remarked by practitioners. For instance, R. Freeman and E.
Nemiroff from Collier Shannon Scott, a law firm, note that “comparative
advertising can be a very effective marketing tool, but with it comes the
risk of challenges by competitors, state attorneys general, and even the
FTC. [. . .] Accordingly, before embarking on a comparative advertising
campaign, ask if a skeptical judge would find your substantiation to be
adequate. Unless spending large amounts of money and company time
on legal challenges is part of your strategic plan, make sure the answer
to that question is ‘Yes’.” (in: We’re Number 1: A Guide to Comparative
Advertising, March 30, 2001).
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To use our model to understand the difference between content
advertising and generic advertising, player I represents the institution
which acts as a watchdog. One then has to define the payoff function
of this player. If the player is a public authority, its objective function
may be welfare measured as unweighted total surplus or consumer
surplus (or any convex combination of the two). In a model where
the third party is a consumer association, the payoff may be given by
consumer surplus. What matters for the mechanism to work is that the
entrant’s advertising strategy contains some verifiable content claims
about quality. Then, the level of advertising expenditure can work as a
signal, as in our model.
What is special to comparative advertising in our model, therefore,
is not so much the fact that the entrant who misleads risks a penalty (and
that consumers use this information to evaluate the entrant’s incentives
to misrepresent). Rather, what is special is that the mechanism triggering
the penalty is enacted by a rival firm. This rival firm would gain by
committing not to challenge any quality claims made by the entrant. It
is the lack of commitment power that makes comparative advertising
viable as a signal. The commitment issue does not arise in the case of
other third parties.
To the extent that rival firms have better access to private informa-
tion about the entrant’s product quality, our signaling mechanism may
be socially superior to one that relies on the intervention of a public
authority. However, because the incumbent’s incentives are guided by
his own profits, public intervention may be needed to complement
for the incumbent’s role as a watchdog. To summarize, neither public
authorities nor rival firms are a complete safeguard against firms
making false content claims,15 but the monitoring by both of them can
improve the informativeness of content claims and reduce the amount
of wasteful advertising.
4.3 Role of the Courts
In our formal analysis, we assumed that courts find unambiguous
evidence and do not make mistakes. If we include the possibility of
courts making erroneous decisions it becomes more difficult to use
comparative advertising as a signal of product quality. Hence, although
our results are robust to small errors by the courts, a well-functioning
15. Witness the recent uproar following the “Ribena” case, where the producer of a
largely advertised fruit juice was discovered to have misled consumers for decades not by
authorities but by two schoolgirls in New Zealand, while they were making homework
experiments for their chemistry class (see, e.g., Jeevan Vasagar, “Schoolgirls rumble Ribena
vitamin claims,” in The Guardian, March 27, 2007).
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court system is critical for the mechanism to work. We would therefore
expect that comparative advertising claims are meaningful only in those
countries in which a court properly intervenes when the advertising
party is accused of making false claims.
Although literal falsity is easy to define, the ruling of the courts will
interact with how market participants (and, in particular consumers) in-
terpret claims of superiority. For instance, general claims of superiority
may be ignored by consumers if they make the experience that courts
do not punish such behavior but may be taken to contain valuable
information in an environment in which courts punish unfounded
superiority claims. Also, particular exaggerated claims about relative
merits of a particular product may be seen as marketing hype in some
countries (and thus in equilibrium ignored by consumers) whereas they
may be taken literally in others. For different attitudes with respect to
such claims in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental
Europe see Barigozzi and Peitz (2006).
A feature of our simple model, in which firms interacted only
once, was that the legal process only started after the product market
interaction had taken place. A more general view would be that court’s
decisions, if taken rapidly, still affect market outcomes. To the extent that
the court’s action affects consumer beliefs, the incumbent is interested
in revealing to consumers that the rival is of low quality. Then it can
be shown that even in the absence of payment of damages comparative
advertising can be a signaling mechanism (see Barigozzi et al., 2006).
In particular, this holds for the polar case, in which the product market
opens only after the court’s verdict. In this case, an important measure
by the court is to force the entrant to pay for corrective advertising so
that consumers are correctly informed.
5. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that comparative advertising has a
different signaling potential than generic advertising. In particular,
comparison ads may trigger a reaction by the firm that is the target
of the comparison. The strategy space of the incumbent is a function of
the entrant’s choice about the type of advertising. This may be especially
useful for firms wishing to enter into a market in which an incumbent
with a renowned brand already operates.
To summarize, the entrant uses comparative advertising to give the
incumbent the option to appeal to court. Therefore, consumers can infer that
the entrant must think to have a strong case. This logic appears to be
consistent with the practitioners’ point of view on the use of comparative
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advertising: on the web site of the advertising agency Kaye&Company
(http: \\ www.kayeco.com, consulted May 2001) the use of comparative
advertising is encouraged because it increases credibility for the adver-
tised product: “Side-by-side or ‘A-B’ comparisons can provide prospec-
tive customers with compelling reasons to buy from you. They can also
help build credibility for your product. Subconsciously, the prospective
customer says: -Who would risk making a direct comparison if they
didn’t have something truly superior?-.”
The main policy conclusions of the paper are the following.
First, in an oligopoly situation, when firms have private information,
this information can be revealed to consumers through the use of
advertising. If comparison advertising is banned, a channel is shut that
allowed information possessed by rivals of advertising firms to play
a role. Only the information possessed by the advertising firm can, if
at all, be revealed through generic ads, and likely at a higher cost (in
our model such a signal is not viable). Note that other forms of content
advertising may substitute for comparative advertising. Thus the use
of comparative advertising (or other forms of content advertising) can
increase the incentive of entrants to provide effort. In effect, they can
lower entry costs that are due to asymmetric information and therefore
facilitate entry. In this sense, the FTC’s view that promoting comparative
advertising would promote competition is validated by our results.
Second, it is useful to have a judicial practice that clearly defines
what are contestable claims (e.g., verifiable content) so that incumbents
can use the law properly in order to react to comparison claims and
the courts make few mistakes. If incumbents feel secure that a false or
misleading claim is appropriately sanctioned, they will indeed go to
court. However, judicial practice should depend on the way in which
consumers interpret content claims in comparative advertising. In coun-
tries where consumers are not used to an unprotected environment and
to aggressive marketing, they may view informal and vague comparison
claims, that are not contestable by rivals, as genuinely comparative
claims. Then, an active role by courts and antitrust authorities may be
required. This may explain the more hostile attitude toward the use of
comparative advertising claims in continental Europe compared to, for
example, the United Kingdom and the United States (see Barigozzi and
Peitz, 2006).
Third, as the model shows, a sufficiently high level of damage
payment is necessary to support the signaling mechanism. If, on the
contrary, a large share of consumers were to make their purchasing
decision after observing the court decision (and the court precision is
high), damage payments may not be needed. Hence, the level of damage
payment should critically depend on the extent to which the incumbent
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has been hurt by false or misleading claims. If damages are too high, an
incumbent may excessively use the court system and the entrant may
not venture into comparison ads that would be contested. This would
destroy the information transmission channel provided by comparative
advertising.
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